We reconstruct Cohen, March and Olsen's Garbage Can model of organizational choice as an agent-based model. In the original model, the members of an organization can postpone decision-making. We add another means for avoiding making decisions, that of buck-passing difficult problems to colleagues. We find that selfish individual behavior, such as postponing decision-making and buck-passing, does not necessarily imply dysfunctional consequences for an organization.
Introduction
The Garbage Can Model of organizational decision-making proposed by Cohen, March and Olsen in 1972 (henceforth GCM) (Cohen et al. 1972 ) is among the most widely cited simulation models in the social sciences (Cohen et al. 1997) . It is also a paramount example of a piece of organizational theory developed through computer simulation: In the original article, verbal theoretical statements are followed by a fairly detailed explanation of the corresponding lines of computer code, and these details entail important theoretical assumptions. Simulation results are presented as the implications of the theory, and the code is made publicly available as an appendix.
However, in the subsequent decades the example of the GCM has been rarely imitated (March 2001) . A large part of Organization and Management Theory ignored Computational Science until very recently (Lomi and Larsen 2001). The GCM itself has been seldom discussed in its computational details (see Troitzsch 2008 for a detailed assessment and review, and Masuch and LaPotin 1989 for a notable exception). The conclusions that the GCM supports have been frequently referred to only in general terms as pertaining to a paradoxical world, a kind of unrealistic theater of the absurd without no real organizational implications (for a similar point see Padgett 1980) . At best the GCM has been presented as a prototype of what an actual organization should try not to be.
In fact, a number of empirical studies have been inspired by the GCM ontology and imagery. Japanese companies (Lynn 1982; Takahashi 1997) , politics (Kingdon 1984; March and Olsen 1989; Leach 1997; Richardson 2001), educational organizations (March and Olsen 1976; Weick 1976; Martin 1981; Musselin 1996) , text-book publishing companies (Levitt and Nass 1989), stock exchange regulators (Mezias and Scarselletta 1994), and even UN peacekeeping teams (Lipson 2007) and military organizations (March and Weissinger-Baylon 1986) are all examples of organizations in which the GCM has been applied as a way to capture important aspects of their functioning. More recently, Conaldi and Lomi have argued that the GCM captures essential aspects of the network structure that characterizes the association between problems (software bugs) and solutions (software developers) in open source software development (Conaldi and Lomi 2010) . What this disparate literature demonstrates is that-forty years on-students of organizations continue to recognize the fundamental insights of the GCM in an increasing variety of organizational settings.
Building on the wide empirical basis that these studies contributed to create, in this article we want to show that the GCM highlights surprising and yet logical consequences of sensible assumptions, and that both assumptions and consequences are deeply rooted in organizational theory and practice. We do so by re-writing the GCM as an agent-based model, which is a straightforward operation because the GCM is perhaps the first example of an organization theory explicitly developed through hypotheses about the behavior of discrete objects (our agents) rather than hypotheses on relations among variables.
In reproducing the original GCM we realized that the original model is at the same time incomplete and redundant (Fioretti and Lomi 2008a, 2008b) . It is incomplete in the scope of the hierarchical structures that it assumes. At the same time, it is redundant in the kinds of structures that it makes available to the experimenter. Furthermore, the model is also redundant in the number of indicators that it adopts as measures of performance. We corrected these obvious shortcomings by limiting the model to those structures that produce interesting results, by enabling all agents in the model to adopt these structures, and by devising a minimum number of indicators that capture all interesting properties of the model.
The original GCM has a means for avoiding a difficult problem, which consists of attaching it to another opportunity for decision-making. We interpreted this mechanism as postponing decision-making, and we remarked that the literature (Janis
